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Abstract
In what sense is the direction of time a matter of convention? In The Direc-
tion of Time, Hans Reichenbach makes brief reference to parallels between
his views about the status of time’s direction and his conventionalism about
geometry. In this article, I: (1) provide a conventionalist account of time di-
rectionmotivated by a number of Reichenbach’s claims in the book; (2) show
how forwards and backwards time can give equivalent descriptions of the
world despite the former being the ‘natural’ direction of time; and (3) ar-
gue that this offers an important middle-ground position between existing
realist and antirealist accounts of the direction of time.
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1 Introduction: When time does and does not have a direc-
tion
[I]f someone argues that it is a matter of convention to select the
direction of growing entropy as the direction of time, […] they must not
commit the error […] of overlooking the empirical content associated
with the use of this convention. (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 154)
Although conventionalist attitudes towards spacetime geometry,¹ temporal du-
ration² and simultaneity³ are well known,⁴ little has been written about what it
means to be a conventionalist with respect to the direction of time. Nonetheless,
this appears to be a position adopted by Hans Reichenbach in his book The Direc-
tion of Time (hereafter DoT). In this article, I provide a conventionalist account of
time direction motivated by Reichenbach’s views, place it in relation to his more
well-studied geometrical conventionalism, and explore the relationship between
time-direction conventionalism and related accounts of time direction.
¹E.g. Poincaré (1905); Reichenbach (1957).
²E.g. Poincaré (1976).
³E.g. Reichenbach (1957), Poincaré (1976).
⁴See Ben-Menahem (2006) and Friedman (1983, ch. 7) for classic discussions of conventionalist
positions in philosophy of physics.
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As the title of the book suggests, DoT provides an account of time direction.
However, Reichenbach holds that there is also a clear sense in which time does
not have a direction: it is equally true to describe the world as directed from future
to past as it is to describe it as directed from past to future. Instead, Reichenbach
holds that it is more convenient to use past-to-future talk, and that the convention
of describing the world from past to future has an empirical grounding. Though
his remarks point to a conventionalist thesis of time direction, in line with his ge-
ometric conventionalism, the position is only discussed in fragments within DoT,
and has not been set out in the secondary literature. However, conventionalism
about time direction is a coherent and promising account of the epistemology of
time direction, and has parallels with, but important divergences from, modern
antirealist accounts of the direction of time. In particular, I argue that Reichen-
bachian conventionalism about time direction offers a plausible new angle on the
explanatory specialness of the low-entropy early universe.
Reichenbach presents us with a seeming contradiction: forwards and back-
wards time are equivalent in that they describe the same world; but the direction
of increasing entropy, and not the direction of decreasing entropy, should be re-
garded as the positive direction of time for ‘empirical’ reasons. In order to make
sense of Reichenbach’s position, and to articulate a general conventionalist ac-
count of time direction, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the
view that forwards and backwards time give ‘equivalent descriptions’ of states
of affairs, how Reichenbach motivates this view in the context of time-reversible
systems, how it also applies to time-asymmetric processes in the world, and how
this relates to the question of whether time is directed. Section 3 relates Reichen-
bach’s remarks about the conventional nature of the direction of time to his wider
conventionalism, particularly his theory of equivalent descriptions in the context
of geometry. Section 4 sets out the entailments of a conventionalist thesis about
time direction and considers the empirical grounding of the convention of taking
growing entropy, as opposed to decreasing entropy, to be the positive direction
of time, and how this relates to humans’ preference for causal rather than teleo-
logical explanations. In section 5 I argue that conventionalism about time direc-
tion offers a best-of-both-worlds option between existing realist and antirealist
accounts of time direction, and show how it offers a novel perspective on the re-
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lationship between the directionality of time and the explanatory status of the
low-entropy early universe. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 The equivalence of forwards and backwards time
2.1 Equivalence and time symmetry
In the context of a discussion of the lack of irreversible processes in classical me-
chanics, Reichenbach remarks that ‘[s]ince it is always possible to construct a
converse description [of a process], positive and negative time supply equivalent
descriptions, and it would be meaningless to ask which of the two descriptions
is true’ (Reichenbach, 1956, pp. 31-32; my emphasis). Reichenbach takes it that
all processes allowed by classical mechanics are reversible, meaning that for any
two kinematically possible states x and y, if it is possible for a system to transition
from x to y (i.e. in our ‘future’ direction), then it is also possible for a system to
transition from y∗ to x∗, where ‘∗’ denotes the time reversal operator.⁵ As such,
Reichenbach takes it to be superfluous to describe any process in a particular di-
rection of time. For instance, if we consider a perfectly elastic collision of two
billiard balls of equal mass, where (for instance) there is a total transfer of mo-
mentum m from one ball (Ball 1) to the other (Ball 2), there is no sense in which
the momentum is ‘really’ transferred from one ball to the other, since in one di-
rection of time the transfer is from Ball 1 to Ball 2, and in the other the transfer
is from Ball 2 to Ball 1. Since both descriptions are ‘equivalent’, and it is ‘mean-
ingless to ask which […] is true’, we can regard them to equivalently express the
same time-order facts, namely that the collision occurs temporally between Ball 1
having zero momentum and Ball 2 momentum m, and Ball 1 having momentum
m and Ball 2 having zero momentum.⁶
⁵Though ideally one might like to think of time reversal invariance as holding that a theory
allows some sequence of states if and only if it also allows the temporally reversed sequence of
the same states, in reality time reversal also has to operate on the so-called ‘instantaneous’ states
of systems. For instance, if we define a state of a Hamiltonian system in terms of the position
and momentum of a single particle, the time reverse would be the same position but the opposite
momentum (as though the particle were headed in the opposite spatial direction).
⁶In this case the two time-directed descriptions would differ as to the values of the momenta
of the balls, since each description would ascribe the negative momentum of the other, so here ‘m’
refers to an adirectional surrogate of momentum.
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2.2 Equivalence and time asymmetry
Although Reichenbach motivates his claim of forwards and backwards time being
equivalent in the context of classical mechanics, with the absence of irreversible
processes, it is clear from later remarks in DoT that he takes this equivalence to
hold even with respect to irreversible macroscopic processes, where a direction of
time is definable. This is most notable in his discussion of the time asymmetry of
entropy. Reichenbach, building on Boltzmann’s view that the difference between
past and future can be grounded in terms of the entropy gradient, provides a def-
inition of the direction of time as ‘the direction in which most thermodynamical
processes in isolated systems occur’ (ibid., p. 127). However, he adds that due to
the equivalence of time-directed descriptions ‘it has no meaning to say […] that
[…] entropy “really” goes up, or that its time direction is “really” positive’ (ibid.,
pp. 128–9), later noting that
The two languages L1 [a language in which the positive direction
of time is that of increasing entropy] and L2 [a language in which
the positive direction of time is that of decreasing entropy] represent
equivalent descriptions; one is as true as the other. (Reichenbach, 1956,
p. 154; emphasis in original)
This shows that the equivalence of forwards and backwards time is not merely a
property of ideal time symmetric or reversible systems, but applies also to time
asymmetric systems such as the macroscopic world. But here lies a problem:
there are clear senses in which forwards and backwards time give descriptions
of the world that are inequivalent in numerous ways. This kind of view has been
taken by Gold (1966, p. 327; emphasis added), who notes that ‘the description of
our universe in the opposite sense of time […] sounds very strange but it has no
conflict with any laws of physics. [The] strange description is not describing an-
other universe, or how it might be but isn’t, but it is describing the very same
thing’. Similarly, Price (2004, p. 231; emphasis added) holds that since there is
‘no objective sense in which what we call the future is really the ‘positive’ direc-
tion of time, then we can equally well describe the world by reversing the usual
temporal labelling[, …in which] the familiar expansion from a smooth big bang
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becomes a contraction to a smooth big crunch, with […] extraordinary characteris-
tics’. Clearly a backwards-in-time description of everyday processes yields appar-
ent bizarre and improbable behaviour, such as anti-thermodynamic processes. A
key part of Reichenbach’s conventionalism is to make sense of how and why our
ordinary past-to-future direction of time is to be preferred over its converse. Be-
fore turning to Reichenbach’s wider conventionalist thesis to make sense of this,
we can first isolate the exact problem with which conventionalism about time
direction is concerned.
2.3 Asymmetry and directionality: what’s at stake?
It is important to isolate the central point at issue in Reichenbach’s time direction
conventionalism, and separate it from other features he attaches to the direction-
ality of time. The question is: once we have fixed some definition for distinguish-
ing two temporal directions (for example the direction of ‘increasing entropy’ of
systems and the converse direction of ‘decreasing entropy’) what is the relative
status of these two directions? Is one the ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ direction, or is the
choice between them a more arbitrary matter? This issue is independent of how
the two directions are distinguished. Reichenbach’s account of time direction in
DoT depends largely on his ‘branch systems’ hypothesis.⁷ But conventionalism
about time direction does not stand or fall with the branch systems hypothesis.
More abstractly, we can imagine some idealised asymmetry holding locally be-
tween the two directions of time, such that we’re able to distinguish them. The
question of conventionalism is: on what grounds do we consider one of these the
‘positive’ direction of time?
This issue is also independent of the local nature of time direction in Reichen-
bach’s account. Reichenbach builds on Boltzmann’s suggestion to define ‘earlier’
and ‘later’ roughly in terms of the local entropy gradient,⁸ leaving open, like Boltz-
⁷Reichenbach considers branch systems — quasi-isolated systems which ‘branch off from a com-
prehensive system and remain isolated from then on for some length of time’ (Reichenbach, 1956,
p. 118). His branch systems hypothesis holds that (1) the universe is currently in a relatively low-
entropy state, and (2) there are many branch systems within our universe. Given this, he defines
positive time as ‘the direction in which most thermodynamical processes in isolated systems occur’
(ibid., p. 127).
⁸“[T]he two directions of time are indistinguishable, just as in space there is no up and down [….
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mann, the possibility that the positive direction of time can vary at different sec-
tions of the universe, meaning that there can fail to be a global direction of time
whilst still existing local directions of time. This point is criticised by Earman
(1974), who argues for the preference of a globalisable definition of positive time.
But even if we have a globalisable definition of time direction, such as a temporal
orientation on a relativistic spacetime (like Earman suggests), the question of con-
ventionalism reoccurs: what grounds the preference of one set of timelike vectors
over the reverse set as the ‘positive’ direction of time?
So we are able to abstract away from some of the more contentious finer de-
tails of Reichenbach’s program inDoT to isolate the question of time direction con-
ventionalism. Even though an asymmetry such as thermodynamic irreversibility
is sufficient to define a direction of time, the question of whether the direction
of increasing entropy or the direction of decreasing entropy should be taken to
be the ‘positive’ direction of time requires a different resolution. This point is not
unique to Reichenbach. For instance, Price (2002, p. 88) makes the point that while
‘some people may feel that they can make sense of the possibility that […] there
is an objective fact in nature about the slope of [the] entropy gradient — whether
it is positive or negative’, such a view requires ‘a further fact to be explained, in
addition to the existence of the gradient itself’, conceding that he ‘do[es] not un-
derstand what that additional fact could be, or what could count as evidence for
it, one way or the other’.⁹ The key point is that the ability to define a direction
of positive time is not alone sufficient to justify the choice of one such definition
over its inverse.
J]ust as at a particular place on the earth’s surface we call “down” the direction toward the center
of the earth, so will a living being in a particular time interval of such a single world distinguish
the direction of time toward the less probable state from the opposite direction (the former toward
the past, the latter toward the future)” (Boltzmann, 1964, pp. 446–447).
⁹The philosopher C.D. Broad (1938, pp. 521–2) makes an analogous point in response to McTag-
gart’s (1927) claim that the past-to-future direction is the ‘fundamental sense’ of time on grounds
of circularity. McTaggart takes the movement of the present from earlier to later times to privilege
the past-to-future direction, but Broad notes that this simply ‘presuppose[s] that the direction in
time from earlier to later is more important than the direction from later to earlier’; if we prefer the
later-to-earlier direction, we could alternatively say that time ‘passes’ in the opposite direction.
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3 Conventionalism and equivalent descriptions
Although Reichenbach holds that the past-to-future and future-to-past directions
provide equivalent descriptions of the world, there are what he calls ‘empirical’
grounds for preferring the past-to-future mode of describing processes. This fits
with his own specific brand of conventionalism developed in the context of ge-
ometry, according to which the choice of one description from a set of equivalent
descriptions is not necessarily arbitrary, and in some cases can be preferred on
empirical grounds. In this and the following section, I show how his remarks
about why we should (and do) prefer a language of increasing entropy fit with his
conventionalism about geometry, and offer some suggestions for what this means
about the status of the directionality of time.
3.1 Parallels between geometry and time direction
In taking forwards-in-time and backwards-in-time descriptions to be equivalent,
Reichenbach (1956, p. 31, fn. 2) makes specific reference to his ‘theory of equiva-
lent descriptions’, formulated in other works in the context of geometry, specifi-
cally to his (1951) book The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (RoSP). There, a number
of his remarks about the conventional yet empirical status of geometry parallel
a number of remarks about time direction in DoT. Though DoT does not explic-
itly identify or elaborate on these parallels or the specific place of time direction
within the theory of equivalent descriptions,¹⁰ his views on geometry are instruc-
tive as to how to regard the status of time’s directionality.
When discussing Henri Poincaré’s conventionalist thesis of geometry in RoSP,
Reichenbach remarks:
Poincaré was right if he wanted to say that the choice of one from the
class of equivalent descriptions is a matter of convention. But he was
mistaken if he believed that the determination of natural geometry
[…] is a matter of convention. This geometry can only be ascertained
empirically. (Reichenbach, 1951, pp. 134–135; emphasis added)
¹⁰DoT was published posthumously and incomplete.
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Elsewhere in RoSP, Reichenbach notes that it is an ‘empirical fact’ that ‘the natu-
ral geometry of the world of our environment is Euclidean’ (ibid., p. 137; emphasis
added). This focus on the non-arbitrary nature of conventions, and the possibil-
ity of a convention having empirical support, and so there being a ‘natural’ de-
scription within a set of equivalent descriptions, is also gestured towards in his
discussion of time direction in DoT:
If someone argues that it is a matter of convention to select the direc-
tion of growing entropy [as opposed to decreasing entropy] as the di-
rection of time, [their] conception cannot be called false. But [they]
must not commit the error often connected with other forms of con-
ventionalism: the error of overlooking the empirical content associ-
ated with the use of this convention. (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 154)
There are clear parallels between these passages, indicating that Reichenbach took
claims such as ‘the geometry of our environment is Euclidean’ and ‘entropy in-
creases over time’ to have similar conventional yet empirical status.¹¹ Reichen-
bach at one point also adds the claim that a language of increasing-entropy ‘ap-
pears to us as a more natural language’ (ibid.) than a language of decreasing
entropy. Indeed, Reichenbach provides enough detail in DoT, particularly in the
passages on pp. 153–6, to make clear in what sense he takes the direction of time
to an empirically-grounded convention. In the rest of this section, I show how
his account of equivalent descriptions in the case of geometry carries over to his
views on time direction.
3.2 Reichenbachian conventionalism
Reichenbach has been interpreted both as a conventionalist about geometry, and
as an (non-conventionalist) empiricist about geometry. In his earlier work, he
took his views on the status of geometry to diverge from Poincaré’s conventional-
ism in that he rejected the idea that different geometrical frameworks were on an
equal standing, though in his later work he indicated that his views were much
closer to Poincaré’s. Poincaré (1905, p. 50) famously held that, contrary to Kant,
¹¹This passage is the clearest statement of time direction conventionalism within DoT, and I
return to in in sec. 4.1.
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‘[t]he geometrical axioms are […] neither synthetic a priori intuitions, nor ex-
perimental facts[; …t]hey are conventions,’ the idea being that we require the
epistemic category of convention in addition to the Kantian options of analytic a
priori, synthetic a priori and synthetic a posteriori to accommodate geometrical
statements;¹² crucially holding not merely that geometrical facts are empirically
underdetermined. Rather, Poincaré holds that geometrical axioms are ‘only defi-
nitions in disguise’, with our choice between possible conventions being ‘guided
by experimental facts’ (ibid.). Ultimately, questions about whether a geometry is
true ‘ha[ve] no meaning. One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can
only be more convenient’ (ibid.).
Reichenbach’s own conventionalist views about geometry share key features
with Poincaré’s. Reichenbach’s conventionalism is characterised by the idea that
there are no geometrical facts about the world, but there are various different
equivalent geometrical systems that can be used to represent theworld, with some
being simpler or more natural in light of the empirical facts, and hence preferable.
In his earlier writings, Reichenbach rejected the label of conventionalism for his
own views about geometry primarily on the ground that something’s being a mat-
ter of convention implies that it is to some extent arbitrary, something Reichen-
bach strongly opposed in the case of geometry, noting in his 1922 article ‘Der
gegenwärtige stand der relativitätsdiskussion’ (translated and reprinted as Re-
ichenbach (1958) ‘The present state of the discussion on relativity’) that ‘I should
not like to choose this name [‘conventionalism’] for my view. […T]he term ‘con-
vention’ overemphasizes the arbitrary elements in the principles of knowledge’
(Reichenbach, 1958, pp. 38–39). Rather, he holds that for the theory of relativ-
ity, the ‘choice of geometry […] is no longer arbitrary once congruence has been
defined by means of rigid bodies’ (ibid., p. 38).
However, in his later writings, Reichenbach uses the notion of ‘convention’
and ‘conventionalism’ more widely in discussions of his theory of equivalent de-
scriptions, noting parallels with Poincaré’s views, and creditingMoritz Schlick for
pointing out his earlier misinterpretation of Poincaré’s conventionalism.¹³ For in-
¹²See Ben-Menahem (2006) and Ivanova (2015) for this reading of Poincaré’s notion of conven-
tion.
¹³Reichenbach (1958, pp. 38–39) remarks that he ‘agree[s] with Schlick, who drew my attention
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stance, in RoSP, Reichenbach responds to Einstein’s (1949) discussion of conven-
tionalism — in which Einstein uses a fictional dialogue between Poincaré and Re-
ichenbach — to deny that his own views are substantially distinct from Poincaré’s
conventionalism, remarking that ‘[s]ince I believe that there can be no differences
of opinion between mathematical philosophers if only opinions are clearly stated,
I wish to state my conception in such a way that it might convince, if not Poincaré,
yet Professor Einstein’ (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 135), before continuing with an up-
dated presentation of his geometric conventionalism, which we come to below.¹⁴
3.3 Geometry and equivalent descriptions
Reichenbach’s own understanding of non-arbitrary conventions is based on the
idea that we can empirically determine the properties of spacetime once we have
fixed certain ‘coordinative definitions’ — those that coordinate physical theory to
measurement, such as defining a metre of length in terms of a stick in Paris, or a
straight line in terms of the path of a light ray. A core component to Reichenbach’s
geometric conventionalism is the contention that we cannot establish through
observation whether an object retains its size when transported in space, and so
the introduction of coordinative definitions as conventions plays a key role in
providing empirical meaning to theoretical statements. To illustrate his view, in
his bookThe Philosophy of Space and Time (1957) (originally published in German
in 1928 as Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre) Reichenbach makes use of the idea of
to this matter, that Poincaré, the father of conventionalism, would acknowledge the restricted char-
acter of the combination of the principles and that his stress on the arbitrariness of the principles
themselves was due to the historical context in which he wrote’. See Friedman (1999, pp. 62–64)
and Stump (2015, pp. 76–80) for discussions of Schlick’s criticisms of Reichenbach’s views on con-
ventionalism in his first book The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (Reichenbach, 1965).
¹⁴In order to flesh out the conventionalist aspects of Reichenbach’s views about time direction,
I am using the parallels between these and his geometric conventionalism. It is worth noting here
that both Poincaré and Reichenbach’s conventionalism does also concern other issues relating to
time, namely the measurement of simultaneity and duration of processes. Poincaré (1976) and
Reichenbach (1957) both consider the Einsteinian worry of how it is possible to synchronise two
distant clocks, noting that ultimately this depends upon a simultaneity convention: one cannot
measure that two distant things happen at the same time for much the same reason that one cannot
determine that a measuring stick does not change length upon moving from one object to another;
in both cases a coordinative definition is required to determine simultaneity and so also to determine
that two processes are of equal duration. These conventionalist aspects of time stem from concerns
about measurement, which is not the case for the conventionalist thesis about time direction.
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a universal force — one that has some particular effect on a body regardless of
its composition, e.g. one that could shrink a wooden stick and a metal stick by
an equal factor. When transporting a measuring rod from one object to another
object in space, in order to check whether the objects are of equal length, it is
a standard presupposition that there is no such force and so that the rod does
not itself change in size while being transported. Only once this presupposition
is fixed as a coordinative definition can we take our measurements to determine
whether or not the objects are indeed of equal length, and so determine metrical
relations between bodies:
There is no way of knowing whether a measuring rod retains its
length when it is transported to another place; a statement of this
kind can only be introduced by a definition. (Reichenbach, 1957, p.
16)
Since such a universal force would be empirically undetectable and invalidate our
measurements, it is convenient, Reichenbach suggests, to disregard the existence
of such a thing, even though this is not empirically forced.
Reichenbach considers a universal force F that distorts measuring instru-
ments ‘in such a way that the actual geometry is an arbitrary geometry G, while
the observed deviation fromG is due to a universal deformation of the measuring
instruments’ due to F (ibid., p. 33). A consequence of this is that it establishes,
according to Reichenbach, the equivalence of all geometries — ‘it follows that it
is meaningless to speak about one geometry as the true geometry’ (ibid.). Instead,
he holds that only the combination ofG+F is a ‘testable’ statement. Reichenbach
builds on this in later writings, developing his theory of equivalent descriptions:
This consideration shows that there is not just one geometrical de-
scription of the physical world, but that there exists a class of equiv-
alent descriptions; each of these descriptions is true, and apparent
differences between them concern, not their content, but only the
languages in which they are formulated. (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 133)
Reichenbach asks us to assume that the following two descriptions were com-
patible with empirical observations of the world:
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Class G1:
G1a. Euclidean geometry + universal force
G1b. Non-Euclidean geometry + no universal forces
And that the following two descriptions were compatible with a different possible
world, distinct from the actual world:¹⁵
Class G2:
G2a. Euclidean geometry + no universal forces
G2b. Non-Euclidean geometry + universal force
The members within an individual class are equivalent descriptions; Reichenbach
holds that each such description is of equal truth value, and it would be ‘erroneous’
to discriminate between them. It is this equivalence of descriptions within a class
that he identifies with conventionalism:
Conventionalism sees only the equivalence of descriptions within
one class, but stops short of recognizing the differences between the
classes. (Ibid., p. 136)
The different classes of descriptions are not equivalent. Reichenbach takes it to
be an empirical matter as to which class is true: ‘the different classes [of equiv-
alent descriptions] are not of equal truth value. Only one class can be true for a
given kind of world; which class it is, only empirical observation can tell’ (ibid.,
pp. 136–137). Rather, the two classes are designed to describe different worlds (or
different environments within a single world); crucially the two classes should
¹⁵In this context, a ‘different possible world’ is simply meant to correspond to a situation where
we have a distinct reality rather than merely a different description of the same reality. Reichen-
bach is primarily concerned with cases where there can be an empirical distinction and where there
cannot. Equivalent descriptions cannot be empirically distinguished since they are compatible with
all the same observations — they can only be pulled apart through the adoption of some specific co-
ordinative definition, which is conventional and not empirical (such as ruling out universal forces).
Inequivalent descriptions — those that belong to different classes — can in principle be empirically
distinguished since they make different empirical predictions, and so they cannot be true of the
same world. As such, different classes of descriptions describe different possible worlds.
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be empirically distinct, though the empirical data alone could not distinguish be-
tween descriptions within a class.¹⁶ Reichenbach is clear that by ‘equivalent de-
scriptions’ he means that the different members within a single class do not refer
to different ways reality could be, but merely different ways of representing a sin-
gle reality. As such, conventionalism applies in the domain of selecting a single
member within a class with which to describe the world. Conversely, the choice
between classes is something that can in principle be empirically determined. In
order to settle on a description within a class, one must fix a particular coordina-
tive definition, such as ruling out universal forces.
3.4 ‘Natural’ geometry
One aspect of Reichenbach’s geometric conventionalism that is of particular im-
portance to the case of time direction is that there can be a ‘normal system’ or ‘nat-
ural’ descriptionwithin a class of equivalent descriptions, much like howwe ubiq-
uitously prefer past-to-future descriptions of processes in the world over future-
to-past descriptions.
Instead of using classes of descriptions, it is convenient to single out,
in each class, one description as the normal system and use it as a
representative of the whole class. In this sense, we can select the
description for which universal forces vanish as the normal system,
calling it the natural geometry. (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 137; emphasis
added)
So we have the idea that even in a class of equivalent descriptions one can be
considered the ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ member. He adds furthermore that we ‘can-
not even prove that there must be a normal system; that in our world there is
one, and only one, must be regarded as an empirical fact’ (ibid., p. 137). In the
case of geometry, Reichenbach takes Carl Friedrich Gauss’ famous experiment —
in which he purportedly demonstrated the Euclidean nature of space by means
¹⁶To be clear: for Reichenbach two sets of descriptions are equivalent if they are different ways
of describing the same reality, such as you describing a road from right-to-left and me describing
it from left-to-right; and a class of equivalent descriptions is a set of descriptions that describe
the same reality. For Reichenbach, the empirical data picks out a particular class of equivalent
descriptions over other classes, but does not distinguish one description within a class.
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of constructing a triangle between three mountain tops — to provide empirical
evidence for G2a.¹⁷ According to Reichenbach:
Gauss’ experiment presents important empirical evidence. The natu-
ral geometry of the space of our environment, within the exactness
accessible to us, is Euclidean[….] If Gauss’ experiment had […] re-
vealed a measurable deviation from Euclidean relations, the natural
geometry of our terrestrial environment would be different. In order
to carry through a Euclidean geometry we then would have had to re-
sort to the assumption of universal forces that distort light rays and
transported bodies in a particular way. That the natural geometry
of the world of our environment is Euclidean must be regarded as a
fortunate empirical fact. (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 137)
This makes clear that Reichenbach considers the convention of assuming univer-
sal forces to make the data fit a Euclidean geometry to be in some sense unnatural.
As Ben-Menahem (2006) notes, Reichenbach’s notion of convention is ‘that which
guides decisions between equivalent descriptions’, where such decisions ‘are not
about truth, but rather, about the best way of representing truth’ (p. 116). The
implication is that the only relevant fact is that some class of equivalent descrip-
tions is true, and there is no deeper fact about which of these is true.¹⁸ So what we
are considering here is not what is the actual geometry of the world, but what is
the most convenient description within the empirically preferred class of equiv-
alent descriptions for representing the phenomena. In this case, Reichenbach is
implying that the convention of assuming no universal forces is more natural and
hence preferable, and as such, given the data, we should prefer G2a and take the
geometry of our environment to be Euclidean and not non-Euclidean.¹⁹
Given his treatment of the past-to-future and future-to-past directions of time
¹⁷This is a slightly awkward aspect of Reichenbach’s presentation within RoSP, since he previ-
ously asks us to assume that the empirical data accords to Class 1 rather than Class 2.
¹⁸Indeed, Reichenbach notes that ‘material objects do not define a single geometry, but a class
of geometries; this is precisely the meaning of conventionalism’ (Reichenbach 1921; translated by
Giovanelli 2013, p. 3840).
¹⁹The grounds on which the absence of universal forces is ‘more natural’ is not clear: his words
imply that the absence of universal forces is simpler, and that the invocation of an unobservable
force would be inelegant.
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as providing equivalent descriptions, it is clear that Reichenbach has in mind an
analogous conventionalism about time direction, according to which there is no
fact of the matter as to the direction of time. But in order to flesh out this position,
more needs to be established: what exactly comprises the relevant set of equiv-
alent descriptions we are to choose between; and is there a ‘natural’ convention
that guides us to representing the world as past-to-future directed?
4 What’s conventional about time direction?
We’re now in a position to ascertain in what sense forwards and backwards time
provide equivalent descriptions. As in the case of geometry, it is not simply
the case that past-to-future and future-to-past languages will automatically give
equivalent descriptions of the world. Rather, equivalence will only apply within
a class of descriptions that, together with other coordinative definitions, suffice
to make the different descriptions empirically equivalent. The key coordinative
principles in the case of time direction turn out to be what Reichenbach calls the
choice between whether to represent the world via a principle of ‘causality’ or a
principle of ‘finality’.
4.1 Causality and finality
By ‘causality’, Reichenbach is referring to cases where correlations between vari-
ables is explainable in terms of their temporal past; and by ‘finality’, Reichenbach
is referring to cases where such correlations are explainable in terms of their tem-
poral future. In other words, by ‘finality’ Reichenbach is referring to teleological
modes of explanation, where some phenomenon or process is explained in terms
of some end goal or ‘telos’. However, as Reichenbach uses the terms, causality
and finality share the same basic structure, differing only in terms of facts about
the direction of time; he suggests that we can only use a language of causality or
finality if we have also fixed a direction of time, i.e. either a language of increas-
ing or decreasing entropy. Elsewhere in DoT Reichenbach uses ‘cause’ and ‘effect’
in a time-direction-neutral language, defining them in terms of thermodynamical
features of systems: ‘[t]he cause is the interaction at the lower end of the branch
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run through by an isolated system which displays order; and the state of order is
the effect’ (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 151). In this sense, we can think of the ‘cause’
as playing the explanans role in an explanation and the ‘effect’ as playing the ex-
planandum role.²⁰ As such, causal explanations are those in which the explanans
is earlier in time than the explanandum, and final or teleological explanations are
those in which the explanans is later in time than the explanandum.²¹
Reichenbach’s discussion of this issue occurs within the context of his pre-
sentation of the time asymmetry of records. Were we to describe the process of
making a footprint in the sand in reverse time, we would simply explain the ex-
istence of the footprint in terms of the ‘future’ interaction of the surface of the
sand with a foot — we would ‘explain improbable coincidences [e.g. the jumping
of grains of sand into the hollow under the foot so as to leave a smooth surface
of sand ‘after’ the interaction] by their purpose rather than by their cause’ (ibid.,
p. 153). In other words, in the future-to-past direction, we simply switch causal
explanations (i.e. those in which the explanans is in the temporal past of the ex-
planandum) for teleological or ‘final’ explanations — ‘explanation leads to finality
instead of causality’ (ibid.). But crucially, Reichenbach takes the two language to
be equivalent in the sense that neither is more true than the other:
Which is the correct language, that of causality or that of finality?
This is certainly a meaningless question. The two languages […] rep-
resent equivalent descriptions; one as true as the other. (Ibid., p. 154)
What we can infer from his discussion of this issue, together with his wider the-
sis of defining the direction of time in terms of the direction of entropy increase
for the majority of branch systems, is a conventionalism about time direction
analogous to his conventionalism about geometry. In this case, what constitutes
the equivalent descriptions is not merely the converse sets of time-directed de-
scriptions, but a particular combination of (1) a direction of entropy increase or
²⁰Where the ‘explanans’ is the thing doing the explaining and the ‘explanandum’ is the thing
being explained.
²¹For example, if we consider a case inwhich the throwing of a stonewas the cause of thewindow
breaking, then in reverse time — from future to past — the explanation is teleological since the effect
(the breaking of the glass) temporally precedes the cause (the stone throw).
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decrease and (2) a language of causality or finality. Fitting this with the struc-
ture of Reichenbach’s geometrical conventionalism, we can set out the classes of
equivalent descriptions in the case of time direction as follows:
Class T1:
T1a. Increasing entropy + causality
T1b. Decreasing entropy + finality
Class T2:
T2a. Increasing entropy + finality
T2b. Decreasing entropy + causality
As with the case of geometry, descriptions within a class have the same truth
value, but the different classes are empirically distinct. This way of presenting
time direction conventionalism fits with the following passage in DoT:
If someone argues that it is a matter of convention to select the di-
rection of growing entropy [as opposed to decreasing entropy] as
the direction of time, [their] conception cannot be called false. But
[they] must not commit the error often connected with other forms
of conventionalism: the error of overlooking the empirical content
associated with the use of this convention. (Ibid., p. 154)
It is clear that Reichenbach is drawing parallels between his views on the direction
of time and the status of geometry. Reichenbach appears to have multiple ‘empir-
ical facts’ in mind. One to which he explicitly refers is the ‘parallelism of entropy
increase’ for branch systems: for quasi-isolated subsystems of the universe, as
well as the universe itself, the directions of increasing entropy are parallel — they
increase in entropy in the same direction and not in different directions.²² It is this
that allows us to talk of a general positive time direction being defined, and which
²²Reichenbach’s principle of parallelism of entropy increase: ‘In the vast majority of branch
systems, the directions toward higher entropy are parallel to one another and to that of the main
system’ (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 136). Of course, it follows that the directions towards lower entropy
are also parallel.
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Reichenbach takes to be an ‘empirical hypothes[is] which [is] convincingly veri-
fied’ (ibid., p. 154). This alone does not pick out the direction of entropy-increase
or entropy-decrease, since the parallelism itself is not in any sense directed. But
Reichenbach ties this parallelism to the notion of causality, noting that ‘the con-
vention of defining positive time through growing entropy is inseparable from
accepting causality as the general method of explanation’ (ibid.), and further:
Once the direction is assumed in the usual sense [i.e. positive time is
the direction of increasing entropy], it is not a matter of personal pref-
erence, not a mode of consideration, whether we should describe the
world in terms of causes or of ends: it is a physical law that causality,
and not finality, governs the universe. (Ibid.; emphasis added)
This can be understood in terms of the asymmetric structure of causal networks,
in which correlations between variables that are not the direct cause or effect of
each other are explainable in terms of their causal past and not their causal future.
Reichenbach discusses this in the context of his Principle of Common Cause (Re-
ichenbach, 1956, ch. 19), remarking that while some causal forks are closed to the
future, such as when two independent events have a common effect, ‘a common
effect cannot be regarded as an explanation’ (ibid., p. 163) of the correlation. This
asymmetry is taken by Reichenbach to be due to the second law of thermodynam-
ics.
The convention of taking the direction of entropy-increase to be the direc-
tion of positive time is tied to the convention of causality over finality: once one
is fixed, the other follows empirically. We can regard these as on a par — nei-
ther alone is strictly an empirical matter, but once one is chosen, the other is
not open to choice.²³ Which of these ought to be the one fixed by convention
is not clear from Reichenbach’s writings — as we see in the next subsection, he
offers justification for each being natural conventions. But regardless of whether
we choose causality or finality, or the direction of entropy-increase or entropy-
²³This mirrors the dynamical nature of conventions in Reichenbach’s wider philosophy; his ‘rela-
tivised a priori’ principles. For instance, the light postulate (that the speed of light in a vacuum is a
constant [c = 3.0×108 ms−1]) can be taken to be an empirical matter in the context of Newtonian
theory, and a coordinative definition (i.e. a constructive principle) in the context of special relativity
theory).
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decrease, what can be established empirically is that Class T1 is true and Class T2
is false.
4.2 A ‘natural’ direction of time
Within Class T1, the conventionalist framework allows us a choice between T1a
and T1b, but there are overwhelming biological and psychological reasons for
preferring each of: causality over finality; and the direction of increasing entropy
over the direction of decreasing entropy.
Reichenbach takes the principle of causality and the choice of the direction of
entropy-increase as the positive direction of time to go hand-in-hand: ‘the con-
vention of defining positive time through growing entropy is inseparable from
accepting causality as the general method of explanation’ (Reichenbach, 1956, p.
154). But which of these should be regarded as the convention to be fixed, and
is there good reason for fixing either over their converse (e.g. a principle of fi-
nality, or the definition of entropy-decrease as the positive direction of time)?
There appear to be motivations put forward in DoT for each of these to be natural
conventions for beings like us.
Ultimately this aspect of Reichenbach’s thought is left open due to the incom-
pleteness of DoT, with the final chapter on the connection between physical and
psychological time being unwritten at the time of his death. It seems clear how-
ever that Reichenbach considered past-to-future time as the ‘natural’ direction of
time, analogous to his conception of a natural geometry within a set of equivalent
descriptions:
That [a language of increasing entropy] appears to us as a more nat-
ural language, that we are so strongly disposed toward the identifica-
tion of the direction from interaction to order with positive time, has
its basis in the nature of the human organism. (Ibid.)
Unfortunately this passage continues: ‘The discussion of this problem may be
postponed’ (ibid.), with the added footnote from Maria Reichenbach observing
that ‘[t]his problem would have been discussed in the projected chapter on the
human mind, which was to have been the final chapter [of the book]’ (ibid., p.
154, fn. 2). Nonetheless, the above passage is interesting as it suggests that the
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direction of entropy increase is preferred by humans for biological reasons. Re-
ichenbach elsewhere indicates that he takes us to experience time in the direction
of increasing rather than decreasing entropy:
The use of such a language [of finality…] would be extremely incon-
venient, because it contradicts the time direction of psychological expe-
rience. (Ibid., p. 154; emphasis added)
This is a more contentious claim: without a clear account of what ‘psychological
experience’ is taken to be, it is unclear in what sense psychological experience is
time directed.²⁴ If we take psychological experience here to refer to something like
the accumulation of memories, then there’s a clear sense in which that is directed
towards the future (i.e. is parallel to the direction of increasing entropy). In the
fragments from the unfinished final chapter of DoT, included in the Appendix,
Reichenbach appears to suggest something along these lines:
Why is the flow of psychological time identical with the direction of
increasing entropy? […]The answer is simple: Man is a part of nature,
and his memory is a registering instrument subject to the laws of
information theory. The increase of information defines the direction
of subjective time. (Ibid., pp. 269–270)
What we call the time direction, the direction of becoming, is a rela-
tion between a registering instrument and its environment; and the
statistical isotropy of the universe guarantees that this relation is the
same for all such instruments, including human memory. (Ibid., p.
270)
This points to an account where the direction of psychological time is understood
in terms of the direction of accumulated memories, which is then underwritten
by the asymmetry of records due to the thermodynamic time asymmetry.
It is clear that Reichenbach took T1a to be preferred to T1b, and thus for the
direction of positive time to be that of increasing entropy, and for the world to
²⁴See Farr (2022a) for an extended discussion of the question and critique of Reichenbach’s re-
marks about the direction of psychological time.
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be governed by causality rather than finality, due to natural grounds, namely
the nature of human biology and psychology and their connection to the thermo-
dynamic time asymmetry. This marks a disanalogy between time direction and
geometry, since Reichenbach appears to motivate the choice of a ‘natural’ geom-
etry on the grounds of simplicity — i.e. the elimination of unnecessary universal
forces — rather than on the nature of human psychology.²⁵
5 The best of both worlds?
With the Reichenbachian conventionalist account of time direction in hand
(which I hereafter refer to simply as ‘conventionalism’), it is instructive to see
how it stands in relation to other accounts of time direction, and what new
perspectives it offers to existing debates. First, I show how conventionalism is
an antirealist account of time direction²⁶ that manages to maintain some key
motivations of realist accounts, making it a best-of-both-worlds view. And
second, I argue that conventionalism helps to clarify an existing problem for
antirealist accounts of time direction: the explanatory status of the low-entropy
early universe.
5.1 Conventionalism as moderate antirealism about time direction
Realist and antirealist accounts of time direction disagree over whether there is
an objective directionality of time. This distinction can be hard to pin down,²⁷ but
we can put it as follows: realism holds that there are time-directed facts that make
future-directed descriptions of theworld true and past-directed descriptions of the
world false; and antirealism denies that there exist such time-directed facts. On
this way of demarcating realism and antirealism it is clear that conventionalism
is antirealist: truth is attached to classes of equivalent descriptions rather than
²⁵Of course, Reichenbach’s conventionalism about geometry has its origins in Kantian epistemol-
ogy, and in this sense one can speculate as to whether Reichenbach held analogous views about
Euclidean geometry being simpler, more natural, or more convenient for us in part due to facts
about our spatial psychology, in line with Kant.
²⁶In terminology I defend elsewhere (Farr, 2020), conventionalism is a C-theory of time insofar as
it holds that there is a key sense in which time is adirectional — crucially there are no time-directed
facts according to conventionalism, and so time ultimately lacks a direction in that specific sense.
²⁷See Farr (2020) for a discussion of different ways this distinction can be made.
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individual descriptions, and descriptions within a class can disagree as to whether
the positive direction of time is represented as past-to-future or future-to-past.
Hence conventionalism denies there are time-directed facts.²⁸
However, conventionalism is a moderate form of antirealism; it shares a fea-
ture with realism in that it denies that past-to-future and future-to-past descrip-
tions are wholesale equivalent, making it a middle-ground position. It does this
in two ways. Firstly, languages of increasing entropy and decreasing entropy
are equivalent only given the right coordinative definitions. As Reichenbach sug-
gests, when using a language of decreasing entropy to describe our world, we are
only accurately describing our world if we also adopt a principle of finality; if
we instead adopt a principle of causality, implying that lower-entropy states are
‘produced’ by higher-entropy states, then we are describing a different possible
world in the sense that it is empirically inequivalent to the world described by our
conventional entropy-increasing causal description. Secondly, conventionalism
holds that the entropy-decreasing description of the world obeying a principle of
finality is not the natural description of the world, and that the entropy-increasing
causal description is preferred. As such, regardless of whether we use forwards
or backwards time to describe it, the world accords to a causal structure whereby
lower-entropy states explain higher-entropy states and not vice versa. In this way,
conventionalism satisfies a key motivation for realist accounts of time direction,
namely that there are good grounds for holding that earlier states determine later
states of the world and not vice versa.
Because of its hybrid nature, conventionalism offers a kind of antirealism
about time direction that avoids a major criticism aimed at antirealist accounts.
The time-direction realist Tim Maudlin (2002, 2007, 2012) argues that antirealism
about time direction fails to account for why the past-to-future direction provides
better explanations of phenomena than the opposite direction, using this to de-
fend his own time-direction realism. Maudlin holds that it is simply a fact that
²⁸A time-direction realist could adopt the epistemically modest position that there is a fact as to
whether entropy really increases or decreases, but that this fact is underdetermined by experience.
This view is importantly different from conventionalism. Instead, conventionalism holds that there
simply is no such fact — forwards and backwards time can, together with an accompanying prin-
ciple of causality or finality, describe the same possible world. The key distinction is that realism
holds that forwards and backwards time do describe different possible worlds.
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‘there is […] a fundamental direction of time, in virtue of which it is correct to
say that the universe is expanding and new matter being created, rather than con-
tracting with matter being destroyed’ (Maudlin, 2012, p. 166), and that this direc-
tionality of time explains why it is that there are probable (i.e. entropy-increasing)
evolutions towards the future and improbable (entropy-decreasing) evolutions to-
wards the past: ‘[t]his sort of explanation requires that there be a fact about which
states produce which[, which] is provided by a direction of time’ (Maudlin, 2007,
p. 134; emphases added), with the implication that an antirealist account of time
direction has no such resources. But this characterisation of time-direction antire-
alism is false since it does not account for conventionalism. Contrary toMaudlin’s
claim, conventionalism: (a) allows for an objective distinction between causes and
effects; (b) denies that the existence of a preferred direction of causal explanation
entails that there is a fact about the direction of time; and (c) accounts for why
we take the past-to-future direction as the natural direction of time.
As we saw in sec. 2.2, Gold and Price have held a more extreme time-direction
antirealism than Reichenbach, suggesting that it is equivalent to say the future
produces the past as vice versa, better fitting Maudlin’s characterisation of time-
direction antirealism. Price suggests that, in the direction of entropy decrease,
‘the familiar expansion from a smooth big bang becomes a contraction to a smooth
big crunch, with […] extraordinary characteristics’ (Price, 2004, p. 231; emphasis
added), those extraordinary characteristics being that ‘the matter in the universe
is collapsing towards a big crunch […] and that as it does so, something very pecu-
liar is happening […for example, t]he motions of the individual pieces of matter in
the universe are somehow conspiring to defeat gravity’s overwhelming tendency
to pull things together’, etc. (ibid.). Similarly Gold notes that the universe, when
described in the future-to-past direction of time, ‘sounds very strange’, involving
processes such as disordered systems tending to become ordered, heat flowing
from colder to hotter bodies, dark patches of space emitting radiation, etc. (Gold,
1966, pp. 326–7). In both Price’s and Gold’s accounts, the equivalence of forwards
and backwards descriptions appears to imply the equivalence of descriptions like
T1a and T2b, since both authors appear to describe backwards-in-time processes
in causal rather than teleological terms. However, the time-direction convention-
alism I have set out holds that when using the direction of decreasing entropy as
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positive time, we must be careful to use a language of finality, or else we end up
describing a different possible world — one that is not our actual world. This issue
becomes particularly pronounced when considering the explanatory status of the
low-entropy early universe.
5.2 Conventionalism and the Past Hypothesis
The ‘Past Hypothesis’ (PH) is the assumption that the early universe was in a
macrostate of extremely low entropy, and various philosophers have argued that
this is alone sufficient to account for the various arrows of time (e.g. Albert (2000),
Kutach (2002, 2013) and Loewer (2007, 2012)). For instance, Boltzmann (1967)
holds that the second law of thermodynamics ‘can be proved from the mechanical
theory if one assumes that the present state of the universe […] started to evolve
from an improbable state and is still in a relatively improbable state’, taking the PH
to be ‘a reasonable assumption to make, since it enables us to explain the facts of
experience, and one should not expect to be able to deduce it from anything more
fundamental’. The kind of low-entropy macrostate required would constitute an
extremely small volume of the phase space²⁹ of the universe, meaning that if we
assign each possible microstate of the universe (i.e. each microstate compatible
with the universe’s macrostate) equal probability, it is extremely improbable that
the universewas ever in such a low-entropymacrostate.³⁰ Reichenbach’s views on
this, while motivated by Boltzmann, differ in various ways, and it is unclear how
he justifies PH.³¹ However, conventionalism offers an interesting counterpoint to
two alternative views about how and whether the low-entropy state posited by
PH (call this the ‘Past State’) is to be explained.
²⁹A phase space is an abstract mathematical space in which each point represents a complete
kinematically possible microstate of the system in question — i.e. for a classical Hamiltonian picture,
the position and momentum values of each particle.
³⁰For instance, using Bekenstein-Hawking entropy rather than Boltzmannian entropy, Penrose
(1989) calculates that the probability of the universe having been in a state of sufficiently low en-
tropy as 1 in 1010
123
.
³¹For instance, he takes Boltzmann’s picture to be incomplete, since it does not entail the paral-
lelism of entropy increase (see Reichenbach 1956, p. 137). Reichenbach takes it that for each branch
system, there is a ‘low-point’ of entropy, and that the low-to-high entropy directions are parallel
to each other. But there is no specific defence of PH in DoT.
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Price (2002, 2004) and Maudlin (2007) share the view that antirealists about
the direction of time require a special kind of explanation of the Past State given
its improbability.³² Price holds that if there is ‘no objective sense in which what
we call the future is really the “positive” direction of time’ (Price, 2004, p. 231),
then we should take a low-entropy past to be as demanding of explanation as
we would a low-entropy future. Described in future-to-past time (i.e. the direc-
tion of entropy-decrease) Price holds that the apparent evolution of the universe
towards the Past State constitutes an ‘extraordinary feat of cooperation’ of mat-
ter and forces and ‘trump[s] anything else ever discovered by physics’ (ibid. p.
230). Maudlin, uses analogous reasoning against antirealism and in favour of his
own time-direction realism. On the assumption of PH, each microstate of the
universe is dynamically atypical insofar as evolution towards the past leads to a
lower-entropy macrostate; Maudlin holds that by assuming time has an objective
direction — that earlier global states of the universe ‘produce’ later global states
of the universe — this atypicality of microstates is explained away as a product
of typical (entropy-increasing) evolution from the Past State to the future, with
‘[t]his sort of explanation requir[ing] that there be a fact about which states pro-
duce which[, which] is provided by a direction of time’ (Maudlin, 2007, p. 134).
Call the problem that Price and Maudlin cite the Problem of Bad Evolution:
Problem of Bad Evolution (PBE). If forwards and backwards time are equiv-
alent, then the Past State can be understood as the product of vastly
improbable evolution from higher-entropy states.
For the reasons laid out in the previous subsection, conventionalism avoids
PBE, and as such avoids both Price’s conclusion that the Past State requires a spe-
cial explanation, and Maudlin’s conclusion that time direction realism offers an
explanatory advantage over antirealism. While conventionalism offers an antire-
alist account of the direction of time, it takes it to be false that the Past State is the
causal product of evolution in the direction of decreasing entropy. On our con-
ventionalist account of time direction, descriptions T1a (increasing entropy and
³²The two come apart insofar as Maudlin thinks that a kind of realism about time direction over-
comes a key aspect of the problem of PH, whereas Price holds that time direction realism itself
offers no solution.
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causality) and T2b (decreasing entropy and causality) are not equivalent; rather,
Reichenbach takes T2b to be empirically falisified. As such, it is a mistake to
think that the equivalence of time-directed descriptions entails that the Past State
can be equivalently described as a cause of entropy increase and a causal product
of entropy decreasing systems. It is only the latter that gives rise to the kinds of
vastly improbable conspiracies that Price speaks of, and that Maudlin wishes to
avoid. For this reason, conventionalism avoids PBE, and so the antirealist about
time direction can deny the future ‘produces’ the past whilst holding that the past
‘produces’ the future. Conventionalism holds that forwards and backwards time
provide equivalent descriptions of the world only insofar as the former is causal
and the latter teleological. In the teleological future-to-past description of the
world (i.e. T1b), the Past State functions as part of the explanation of the entropy
gradient rather than something explained by the entropy gradient.³³
6 Summing up
Though only discussed briefly within DoT, Reichenbach’s views on the direction
of time fit a conventionalist thesis of time direction analogous to his convention-
alism about geometry. Conventionalism about time direction offers an antirealist
account of time direction insofar as it denies that there is an objective fact that
time really ‘goes’ in one direction than the other — in Reichenbachian terms, that
entropy really increases or decreases with time. But this equivalence of time di-
rections does not entail that it is equally true to say that the future produces the
past as to say the past produces the future. Rather, Reichenbach makes clear that
a language of increasing entropy is only equivalent to a language of decreasing en-
tropy if the two languages are in turn accompanied by principles of causality and
finality accordingly. Our world is either : (1) one governed by causality in which
entropy increases; or (2) one governed by finality in which entropy decreases.
And (1) is to be preferred over (2) as the ‘natural’ description of the world for a
variety of reasons relating to our human perspective in the world. Understood in
this way, conventionalism about time direction offers a useful middle-ground be-
³³See Farr (2022b) for an extended defence of time-direction conventionalist reading of the past
hypothesis.
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tween full-blown antirealism about time direction (in which it is no more true to
say that the past determines the future rather than vice versa) and realism about
time direction (according to which it is true that entropy increases and false that
entropy decreases), offering the antirealist about time direction new options for
dealing with problems levelled at antirealist accounts, such as the explanatory
status of the low-entropy early universe.
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